

INFALLIBILITY: a structural analysis : Georges Tavard A.A.

FOREWORD

Contemporary linguistics is an explosive science which goes in many directions. Two major currents have been left out of the present essay: the one deriving from Ludwig Wittgenstein (to be treated by George Lindbeck), and Noam Chomsky's transformational-generative grammar (influential in theology through the researches of Erhardt Güttgemanns). My work is limited to the structuralism proceeding from Ferdinand de Saussure, as developed by Louis Hjelmslev, A.J. Greimas, Claude Lévi-Strauss.

For an initiation to linguistic and structuralist approaches to theology, I would refer to several issues of Recherches de Science Religieuse (1970, n.1; 1973, n.1; 1974, n.2), and to my forthcoming volume, La Théologie parmi les Sciences Humaines (Paris, chez Beauchesne). I may also mention my previous contribution concerning the bull Unam Sanctam (Lutherans and Catholics in Dialogue, V).

Although it is not an excuse for the inadequacies of the present paper, I have had to write this essay without an adequate library. I plead the readers' indulgence for the lack of explanatory footnotes that could have made the argument clearer.

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
Infallibility: a structural analysis

In keeping with the definitions of Vatican I and II, infallibility is a predicate with four possible nouns:


- (a) the speaker of a discourse (i.e. the pope);
- (b) a discourse (i.e. a definition of faith);
- (c) the office of the speaker of a discourse (i.e. the papacy);
- (d) the context in which a discourse is pronounced (i.e. the conditions for ex cathedra definitions).

Thus, infallibility raises problems of a linguistic order (in a and b), of an institutional order (in c), of a contextual order (in d). (a) and (b) are closely related, since, according to Vatican I and II, it is not anyone, but the bishop of Rome, who makes infallible discourses. (For clarity's sake I will not consider the question of the infallibility of councils and of bishops in general.) (a) and (c) imply each other, since the speaker (a) is the holder of the office (c). (b) and (d) imply each other, since there is a discourse (b) only in the context of the conditions (d).

We may obtain a first approximation of the problem by looking at the articulation of action in A.J. Greimas' analysis: (1)



This basic structure of action-reporting stories applies well to Vatican I's story about the infallibility of the pope:



This diagram reads: Faith accepts as infallible a discourse addressed by the pope to the Church when it sees certain positive conditions fulfilled; it does not accept a discourse as infallible when it does not see the conditions fulfilled.


Infalibility was examined at Vatican I and II in relation to (a, c), the addressor. and (d), the conditions for ex cathedra definitions. A preliminary question relating to (b), the subject or definition faith relationship was left unexamined, being object presumably taken for granted. Yet this question is basic to the whole infallibility construct: Can a discourse be ever recognised as infallible? It would be rash to assume that the answer to this question must necessarily be affirmative. For faith can recognise a discourse as infallible only if infallibility is compatible with the inner structure of human discourse.

I will address myself to this question by briefly examining the elementary structure of signification in the light of Greimas' analysis (I); by examining theology as language in the light of Hjelmslev's conception of language (II and III); by examining the doctrine of infallibility in the light of the structure of myth (IV). This will lead to some suggestion for a reinterpretation of the doctrine (V).

I

The notion of infallibility is a complex notion which involves at least two elements: the notion of truth (the infallible discourse is true), and that of obligation (the infallible discourse must be accepted by faith, as implied in the anathemas of Vatican I against those who would deny the doctrine). I will examine a third element later.

These two elements must be included in the quadrilateral of meaning (2) of the notion of infallibility. We obtain the following:



It appears immediately that, if the truth of a discourse is intrinsic to it and can be verified with the appropriate rules of verification, the obligation to believe it for membership in a Church is not intrinsic to it and can be verified only by reference to something which is outside the discourse itself, namely the rules of adhesion to the Church. A discourse is true or untrue in itself. Its legally binding value for the members of the Church depends, not on the discourse as such, but on the rules of the Church. This corresponds to the distinction between theological truth and canonical obligation. Analysis of a discourse may possibly verify its truth; it cannot verify the legal system of the Church.

Thus the scope of my investigation is restricted to what may be said about the language of discourse. That a certain discourse is used in a further "game" to define Church membership raises problems of another order, which I will not examine here.

II

Theological statements (to which I will assimilate dogmatic definitions, which are one kind of theological statements) are samples of a language usually called theology. Theologies are technical languages using the resources of natural languages. We know that the natural language used (English, French, German, Latin, etc.) is not indifferent to the sort of theology one elaborates. What is not realised so often is, first, that, as a language, every theology follows the basic structure of all language; second, that, as a technical language, each theology creates its own rules in the light of its basic axioms.

In Hjelmslev's analysis, the basic structure of language contains five characteristics: (3)

- a) A language has two levels, expression and content.
- b) A language is structured along two axes, that of discourse (process, text), which may be imaginatively represented as horizontal, and that of system (represented as vertical) according to which the component elements of the discourse are related to one another.

- c) Expression and content are related; and this relationship can be discovered and verified by commutation (as when the content changes with changes in the expression).
- d) A language is made of units of meaning related to one another by rection (necessary implication, which may be unilateral or bilateral) and combination (non-necessary implication).
- e) There is non-conformity between expression and content: although closely related, these are not related by necessary implication.

This analysis suggests a preliminary reflection. Since a theological discourse (for example, the Constitution Pastor Aeternus of Vatican I) depends on the theological system in which it is composed, it can be properly understood only within that system. Criticism made in the context of another system is not a useful exercise. Criticism ought to be made either within the same system (showing, as it may happen, that the language has been used improperly) or in the light of a metalanguage applicable to the discourse which is being examined.

Languages function through the use of a certain number of units of meaning. These provide a sense when they are combined together according to certain rules or conventions. In classical grammar, the units of meaning correspond to semantics, the rules of combination to syntax. The units of meaning are signs, whose meaning is elicited by their combination according to the syntax. A basic principle of the structural analysis of language defines the sign as including two aspects, that which signifies (the expression) and that which is signified (the content).(4) This distinguishes the linguistic sign from chemical and mathematical symbols, from esthetic symbols, from philosophical and theological differentiations between signal, sign and symbol (as in Paul Tillich's theology). A linguistic sign does not point to something else. That which it points to is part of it. The levels of expression and of content are distinct, but inseparable.

Following Hjelmslev, one may analyse this further.(5) In a sign there is, striking first the eye (in reading) or the ear (in hearing), the form of the expression: we perceive sounds or their written equivalents. This form of the expression conveys the substance of the expression: the sounds or the written alphabetic symbols are perceived as units of meaning combined in a certain way. This substance of the expression conveys the form of the content: each language has its own ways of combining units of meaning so that they will be understood. The form of the content elicits the meaning intended by the form of the expression: this meaning is the substance of the content. Thus the linguistic sign has four interrelated components. The form of the expression is the (audible, readable) form of the syntactic form of the content. The substance of the content is the (intelligible) substance of the (intended) substance of the expression. The form of the expression conveys the substance of the content by means of the substance of the expression organised as the form of the content.

This analysis suggests some reflections on the famous distinction promoted by John XXIII between the substance of the faith and its formulation:(6)

The substance of the ancient doctrine contained in the deposit of faith is one thing; the formulation which is put upon it, following, in regard to forms and proportions, the needs of a chiefly pastoral magisterium and style, is another thing.

In this quotation the distinction of substance and formulation is carried to the point of separation. But the previous analysis of a linguistic sign makes such a separation unacceptable. Expression and content are not so exterior to each other that several expressions (signs in the banal sense of the word) can cover one content. "Son of God", "Word of God", "Second Person", "Lord" are not interchangeable expressions equally applicable to the same divine reality. They are expressions of different aspects of the same reality, covering different contents. The linguistic status of a doctrine ties together the formulation and the substance within the framework of a given theology. The formulation (the form of the expression) and the substance of the doctrine (the substance of the content) are joined by two intermediate levels. The substance of the expression may be identified as the theological categories (paradigms) used. The form of the content corresponds to the construction of these categories according to the relevant theological syntax into a recognisable pattern of meaning.

Thus it is not sufficient to say, with Hans Küng, that papal infallibility is a clumsy formulation of the indefectibility of the Church. It is legitimate to attempt to restate the substance of the content (v.gr. the notion of papal infallibility) in the vocabulary and the syntax of another theology. But this, successful or not, does not tell against the unique relationship of formulation and substance in the discourse of Vatican I. This points up the problem of theological translation, which is strictly parallel to that of translation from one natural language into another. No two languages are exactly isotopic.(7) I do not know may be translated as, but does not equal, Je ne sais pas; it can also be translated as Je ne connais pas and as J'ignore, and these expressions convey differences of meaning. If a Frenchman understands I do not know as meaning Je ne sais pas, this is not because the substance of the two contents are identical (they are not), but because they are mutually recognisable. The two, somewhat different, senses convey, besides their special connotations, a denotation which evokes one metasense, namely the common experience of not knowing.

These remarks throw some light on the problem, debated since the Middle Ages, of the object of faith. For Thomas Aquinas, followed by all modern theology, the act of faith has as its object God revealing himself.(8) The enuntiabile or formulated doctrine about God revealing himself is only the instrument by which God revealing himself claims the attention of our intellect by entering our epistemic field. However, one must add that God reveals himself through linguistic signs (the Scriptures, the word of God). These signs must themselves be the object of faith if indeed a linguistic sign includes, not only the exterior instrument of communication, but also the intended and grasped meaning. The meaning is an integral part of the sign. Within the oneness of the theological signs, therefore, the enuntiabile and God must be one joint object of faith. Applying this to the notion of infallibility, we should say either that infallibility is properly (not necessarily, fully, or exhaustively) formulated as object of faith by the definition of it, or that the definition, being unfaithful to the syntax or its theological language, is a non-definition conveying no recognisable meaning. To these alternatives we should also add two others: the notion thus properly defined is verified as non-existent or is non-verifiable. The former alternatives depend on the linguistic analysis of theology; the latter do not, but refer to theology as epistemology

Since de Saussure, structural analysis has insisted on the arbitrariness (9) (non-necessity) of both semantics and syntax. Accordingly, the definition of infallibility will be accepted as true only by those who admit the arbitrary aspects of its theological language. For instance, in the definition of Vatican I, there can be a papal infallibility only if an infallibility has been bestowed by God upon the Church, and if the bishop of Rome, under certain conditions,

is the instrument of it. In this case, Church-infallibility is a metalinguistic principle expressed by a given theology in the form of papal infallibility. The same metalinguistic principle may conceivably be expressed differently by other theological languages. However, we then face again the problem of translation. Expressed differently, one metalinguistic principle will be understood differently. If no doctrine keeps exactly the same meaning when it is translated into other natural languages than that of its genesis, all the more will its meaning be bent by translation into other theological languages. This of course raises a much more radical question than that of infallibility: the notion of doctrinal orthodoxy is involved.

### III

Once the content of a discourse has been perceived, one may verify its truth or its untruth: by way of empirical verification in the case of empirical statements, by way of metaphysical reasoning in the case of metaphysical statements, by way of comparison with the sources of theological certainty (Revelation, Scripture, Tradition) in the case of theological statements. Usually, such verifications will be made after the expression of the doctrine has been understood and systematically examined.

The hypothesis of papal infallibility, however, posits a special difficulty in that the theological discourse considered to be infallible (v. gr., the definition of Mary's Assumption) would not only convey something true, the truth of which would be verifiable by theological research, it would also be known as conveying something true antecedently to the perception of its content. This is the third element in the notion of infallibility. The observer could conclude to the infallibility of a doctrine by investigating the circumstances of its formulation. After examining who spoke, concerning what kind of question, in what capacity, with what intent, he would verify the four conditions of ex cathedra parlance as listed by Vatican I. In other words, the complex of signs constituting a presumably infallible definition would contain more than the four levels that are constitutive of a linguistic sign. There would also be some sort of non-linguistic (belonging to other categories than those of language) and extra-linguistic (not expressed in language) form subsuming the form of the expression and its content. Clearly, the structural analysis of language can say nothing for or against the existence of such non-linguistic and extra-linguistic conditioning of discourse, which would, by definition, escape its analytical methods.

However, since the content of the sign is part of the sign, the meaning of a doctrinal definition is part of the definition. Anyone who analyses it and tests it according to the criteria of the language in which it is couched should be able to assess its truth or its untruth. Obviously, truth is not taken here in the thomist sense of adequatio intellectus et rei. The truth of a sign is its meaning. To judge that this meaning is true in the thomist sense must be done by the verification proceedings which are valid in the context of the theology in use. Analysis of a doctrine may lead to a conclusion regarding its meaning as sign and to another regarding its truth as adequatio intellectus et rei. But there is no way in which analysis of a doctrine can make an antecedent judgment as required by the notion of infallibility. We face the peculiar situation that a doctrine preached, say, by Father Joe Smith may be judged to be correct though not infallible, while the same doctrine proclaimed by Pius XII in the proper ex cathedra conditions would be judged to be both true and

infallible. The meaning of a formulation of doctrine may be discerned in its language; its truth may be verified with the proper criteria. But infallibility belongs to another order. It does not belong to the language, natural or theological, which vehicles the doctrine. If infallibility is affirmed, it must be predicated of something other than the formula in which a doctrine is expressed. And as there is no doctrine apart from its formulation, infallibility cannot be predicated of any doctrine. So far, therefore, it would seem that, of the four possibilities listed above as to the status of the discourse of Vatican I, the second one applies: it is a non-definition, conveying no recognisable meaning, because it postulates the existence of a non-existent, namely, the recognisability of the truth of a discourse before that discourse has been formulated.

In linguistic parlance, infallibility cannot belong to the denotation or denotative meaning of the terms used, but - in certain circumstances - to their connotation. (10) It belongs to the connotation of terms which are used within the recognisable constellation constituted by the conditions for ex cathedra definitions. We could say that infallibility attaches to a statement in obliquo, not in recto. We could also say, in Hjelmslev's language, that it is not expressed in the language used but is one of the elements of an over-arching "connotative semiotic": "A connotative semiotic is a semiotic which is not a language and whose level of expression is constituted by the levels of content and of expression of a denotative semiotic." (11) In this case one should try to discover the nature of the connotation and the structure of its recognisability. But this takes us outside the scope of the analysis of language in the strict sense. Yet another type of structural analysis may be appropriate.

#### IV

The Roman Catholic doctrine of papal infallibility reveals a certain structure within the Roman Catholic Church. This structure has to do with the relationships of various segments of the Church with the doctrines which, as objects of faith, bind the Church together. The doctrine implies that, when certain conditions are met, a positive relationship to doctrine may be asserted antecedently to the emergence of the intrinsic meaning of the doctrine involved. Thus, one may gather the following propositions from Vatican I and II;

1. There is an undetermined Church-infallibility. (undetermined means that the nature and conditions of it have not been clearly explained.)
2. This Church-infallibility comes to determination in the bishop of Rome speaking ex cathedra.
3. The other bishops when in ecumenical Councils or in the consensus of their teaching also share in determining Church-infallibility; yet this sharing itself remains undetermined.
4. Other Church members share in determining Church-infallibility by their sensus fidelium; this also remains undetermined except in its assensus to Church-infallibility in general and papal infallibility in particular.
5. This sensus fidelium may remain dormant, and this assensus may be withheld in individual faithful, **without ruining** their effectiveness among the Church members in general.

The same points may be expressed differently:

1. The bishop of Rome has a positive, determined, antecedent relationship to the definition of doctrine.
2. The bishops as a college have a positive, undetermined, non-antecedent relationship to the definition of doctrine. (It is non-antecedent insofar as no conditions have been explained by which its antecedence may be asserted; one might say that it is antecedently presumed but not certain.)
3. The members as People of God have a positive, undetermined, non-antecedent relationship to the definition of doctrine - which becomes determined in its assensus to papal infallibility.
4. All members (which includes bishops) individually have a negative, undetermined, non-antecedent relationship to the definition of doctrine - which becomes positive and determined in its assensus to papal infallibility.
5. Unbelievers have a negative, determined, non-antecedent relationship to the definition of doctrine.

	formulation	determination	antecedence	<u>assensus</u>
Rome	+	+	+	+
College	+	-	-	+
<u>sensus fidelium</u>	+	-	-	+
individuals	-	-	-	+
unbelievers	-	+	-	-


To translate this into the basic structure of myth, I will reduce the schema to four terms, dropping Episcopal College as redundant since its infallibility functions cum et sub the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff. I will also reduce the four points, formulation, determination, antecedence, assensus, to assensus, since the negativities which appear in the first three columns are corrected by the positivities of the fourth, except in the case of unbelievers, where negativity as to assensus is reinforced by the previous negativities and the one positivity of determination.

We obtain the formula,

Rome  
unbeliever

sensus fidelium  
believer

which derives from the quadrilateral,



The mythical content of the formula emerges when we replace each of these four terms by its equivalent in terms of relationship (kinship):

relationship asserted  
relationship refused

relationship presumed  
relationship accepted



This corresponds well to the more theological terms,

definition  
denial

implicit acceptance  
explicit acceptance

This analysis provides an illustrative model for the problem of infallibility.

As analysed by Claude Lévi-Strauss myth constitutes, besides the two dimensions detected by de Saussure (langue, or the linguistic system of semantics and syntax having synchronic consistency; parole, or the spoken flow of phonemes in which la langue comes to life in diachronic sequence), the third dimension of language. (12) Myth participates of both the fluency of la parole and the permanence of la langue, of the irreversibility of la parole and the reversibility of la langue. Its function is to provide language with an overall meaning in relation to human destiny; it acts as a metalanguage of all that we say. Furthermore, myth has been analysed as illustrating relationships between power, or forces of domination over men and nature, and ties of kinship. Kinship is the datum of human life, the nature with which one starts in society. Power is the ineluctable vocation of human life in its struggle for survival, the means by which nature is transformed by culture.(13)

Now the structure of salvation in Christianity subordinates the appropriation of the power of salvation to certain relationships to the Saviour. The notion of papal infallibility subordinates the appropriation of the power of salvation (as formulated in doctrine) to kinship, not only with the Saviour, but also with the bishop of Rome. Aspirants to salvation become recipients of it by assensus through entering a positive kinship with the bishop of Rome speaking ex cathedra. The bishop of Rome alone has a twofold relationship to salvation as both recipient and formulator of saving doctrine. (Admittedly, nuances would be needed to give a complete picture; but the present streamlining usefully pinpoints the problem). We thus obtain a mythical structure of the Church, where the myth is built in terms of relationships (to the saving doctrine) which are, in Lévi-Strauss's terms, over-estimated (+) or under-estimated (-).

The basic structure of myth suggests that the notion of papal infallibility is, in its origin and its form, extra-theological. It derives from a fundamental structure of language which emerges when language is used to delve into the deeper questions of human destiny. The theological language in which it appears has incorporated the third dimension of language, thus showing at the same time the linguistic status of infallibility and its correlation with the great religious myths of mankind. There is of course no suggestion that the mythical form of Christianity had to take this particular shape. One can then wonder why the mystical dimension of language has taken the form of papal infallibility in Roman Catholicism, and what forms this mythical dimension has adopted in other Christian traditions.

Be that as it may, that papal infallibility is a myth points to the value it may still have as a positive element in theology.

Where does infallibility reside? I see three possibilities. One has often spoken of it as residing in the dogmatic definitions. But this should be ruled out. For if papal infallibility is antecedent, it cannot reside in the defined doctrine which results from it. Does it then reside - second hypothesis - in the bishop of Rome? If so, it would itself be an object of faith independently of any doctrinal definitions that may derive from it. It would then be a

pure form with no other content than itself. But a faith without content cannot be the medium through which we receive God's self-revelation. This should also be ruled out.

A third hypothesis remains. Belief in a positive, determined, antecedent infallibility presupposes a prospective tension toward the future. If myth translates symbolically an eagerness to overcome the anguish of mankind before the ambiguities of existence, the infallibility-myth expresses the hope that the diachronic unfolding of the Christian faith prepares positively the ultimate unveiling of human destiny. Faith does not assent to the form of the myth, but to its substance, to what it intends. It looks forward toward an event when whoever embodies God's self-revelation in formulated doctrines will do so with the ultimate concern to express the truth under the un-failing guidance of the Spirit of God. The conditions for ex cathedra definitions may thus be seen as minimal tests assuring us that the bishop of Rome intends no other thing than to follow the Spirit. In this case, however, papal infallibility resides neither in the definition nor in the bishop of Rome intending to define it or defining it, but in the hope of the People of God that it will not be misled.

It would therefore seem that the anathema sit which follows the definition of papal infallibility at Vatican I was over optimistic in seeing infallibility at the level of the Catholic faith. It should have looked at it in the perspective of the Catholic hope.

V

Structural analysis should, in the best cases, provide some elements of a model for the point under study. The analysis that has been made has led us to conclude that the definition of papal infallibility rests upon a basic assumption: behind the Christian doctrines believed to be revealed by God in Christ, God's own word directed toward the faithful acts as a metalanguage. Being utterly true, like God himself who is, by hypothesis, the absolute Truth, this metalanguage leaves its imprint on our formulation of what we have grasped of the revelation. Theoretically, several options could be open at this point:

1. The transcendent metalanguage is detected a posteriori as activating our language by analysis of formulations of doctrine.
2. Or, it is detected at the very moment when a doctrine is formulated; v. gr., when we read the Scriptures or recite the Creed or listen to the proclaimed word, this transcendent metalanguage is perceived as activating our language.
3. Or, this metalanguage is foreseen even before a doctrine is formulated.

Thus the detection of God as metalanguage could be posterior to, simultaneous with, or anticipatory of, the formulation of doctrine. The third hypothesis was selected by Vatican I as correct as regards the infallibility of the bishop of Rome. However, since, according to the same Council, papal infallibility depends on the convergence of four conditions, the element of anteriority is considerably attenuated. The Council assumes that we may have advance notice that a papal proclamation will be ex cathedra. But supposing we have no such previous certainty of a future event, the judgment that a papal

pronouncement is infallible can only be made a posteriori, after the conditions under which the statement was made have been examined. In any case, the condition relating to the revealed character of a doctrine can hardly appear before this doctrine has been examined carefully. Thus the third option implies the first. But anteriority cannot depend on posteriority. Accordingly, a judgment of infallibility can only be a retroactive judgment.

This allows us to see several features of a satisfactory model for infallibility: (1) God is the metalanguage behind all doctrines considered to be infallible. (2) The judgment that a doctrine is imprinted with that metalanguage so that it may be called infallible is a temporal judgment, related to the doctrine by relationships of posteriority or anteriority. (3) The anteriority judgment of infallibility, insofar as the doctrine is not yet formulated, does not bear on the doctrine itself, which is yet inexistent. It bears on the person who is likely to attempt to formulate it. In this case, the bishop of Rome is seen by anticipation as likely to proclaim a doctrine in the near or the distant future. Thus, the judgment of infallibility belongs to the domain of hope and eschatology.

The structural analysis of myth allows us to go further in model-building. As the third dimension of language, myth becomes operative when language attempts to formulate insights into the ultimate destiny of mankind. As applied both to the pope as formulator and to the doctrine as formulated, infallibility suggests that such formulations belong to the very essence of the Christian faith as it touches on the ultimate destiny of mankind. But such a tie between the formulation of doctrine and the ultimate destiny of mankind is not restricted to occasional solemn pronouncements made by the bishop of Rome. The concept of infallibility should therefore be extended further than envisioned by Vatican I. One should add at least two points:

1. All Christian doctrines, insofar as they participate of the structure of myth, share the infallibility with which God, as metalanguage, marks the human expression of his self-revelation.
2. All persons who, in one capacity or another, formulate such Christian doctrines as relate to the ultimate destiny of mankind, share the infallibility with which God, as metalanguage, marks those who formulate his self-revelation in human language.

Thus, infallibility should be understood as a term expressing the believer's threefold attitude. Knowing that God is the absolute truth, the believer hopes, antecedently, that those who will formulate the Church's apprehension of the revelation will do so with infallible certainty and, when he is so satisfied, concomitantly or posteriorly, that they do so, he believes the doctrines thus enunciated. Accordingly, infallibility expresses both the horizontal-eschatological relationship of the believer to God's absolute truth by way of hope, and his vertical relationship to God's revelatory epiphany by way of faith. It should be understood as an analogical participation in God which is effective in all Christian faith, is experienced by all Christian believers, and is expressed in all Christian discourse.

1. A.J. Greimas: Sémantique Structurale, Paris, 1966, p.172-191.
2. Greimas: Du Sens. Essais Sémiotiques, Paris, 1970, p.135-166.
3. Louis Hjelmslev: La Structure Fondamentale du Langage, in Prolégomènes à une Théorie du Langage, Paris, 1969, p.185-231. On theology as language, see my forthcoming volume, La Théologie parmi les Sciences humaines, Paris, 1975. For a historical introduction to this question, see Battista Mondin: Il Problema del Linguaggio Teologico dalle Origini ad Oggi, Brescia, 1971.
4. Ferdinand de Saussure: Cours de Linguistique Générale, Paris, 1971, p.97-113.
5. Louis Hjelmslev, op.cit., p.58-79; Greimas: Du Sens, p.45-46.
6. Jean XXIII, address to session I of Vatican Council II, October 11, 1962, in Jean XXIII - Paul VI: Discours au Concile, Paris, 1966, p.64-65.
7. Greimas: Sémantique Structurale, p.69-101.
8. S. Th., II II, q. 1, a. 1.
9. De Saussure, op.cit., p.100- ; Hjelmslev: Le Langage, Paris, 1966, p.60ff.
10. Hjelmslev: Prolégomènes.... , p.144-157.
11. Op.cit., p.150.
12. On parole and langue, see Saussure: Cours...., p.27-32. On myth, see Claude Lévi-Strauss: Anthropologie Structurale, Paris, 1958, p.230ff.
13. See Lévi-Strauss: Anthropologie...., p.227-255; Greimas: Du Sens, p.117-134; 185-230; Dan Sperber: Le Structuralisme en Anthropologie, in Qu'est-ce que le Structuralisme?. Paris, 1968, p.69-238; Noel Mouloud: Langages et Structures. Essais de Logique et de Sémiologie, Paris, 1969, p.84-124; Jacques Lacan: Fonction et Champ de la Parole et du Langage, in Ecrits I, Paris, 1971, p.111-208.