SOME NOTES ON "TEACHING AUTHORITY AND INFALLIBILITY IN THE CHURCH" (Theological Studies, March, 1979).

(1) N.2, p.114 ad fin: Pius XII on the assent of Catholics.

The word "assent" here causes real difficulty. To assent to a statement in the indicative mood (e.g. the statement: "The whole human race is descended from a single human couple") is to accept the statement as true. It is an act of the intellect and it involves that one believes the statement to be true. But if a statement is not self-evidencing, one needs to know the grounds on which its truth can be accepted. A non-infallible papal definition is ex hypothesi insufficient grounds for such acceptance. I would prefer to avoid the word, assent, in such circumstances and to speak, e.g. of "religiosum obsequium", cf. Vatican II.

(2) N.6, p.117: "in contrast to the men of old?".

Is it not probable that Matthew means by "it was said to them of old":
"God said to the men of old". i.e. Are we not here presented with the Jewish use of the passive voice to refer to an act of God?

(3) N.9. The Gospel "took shape".

Since later on it is admitted that there is a distinction between the gospel and every human expression of it, this form of words is unfortunate.

(4) N.16: "Infallibility is not a New Testament term".

The closest etymological Greek equivalent of infalliblitas is asphaleia (the root, fall, is presumably identical with the root of sphall; in and a are negativing prefixes). Asphaleia is used in Luke's Prologue ("that you may know the asphaleia of the things in which you have been instructed"). It is also used in Acts 5:23 of a prison "locked up in all security), and in Thess. 5:3: "When they say, Peace and asphaleia). For asphales see its 3 occurrences in Acts, where in each case it means "something definite" or "certain", and in Phil. 3:1 ("giving security"?), Hewbrews 6:19: "an anchor of the soul which is firm and asphales". The adverb asphalos occurs thrice in the NT, meaning: without fail, for certain, securely. And the verb asphalizo occurs 4 times, meaning "make secure", literally. Thus the asphal. words might support an interpretation of infallibilitas as = sure reliability.

(5) N.18: "Gained special importance" - and cf. the two closing sentences of n.17.

To say that the see of Rome gained special importance is question-begging.

- (1) The primacy of the Roman see, evidenced in the affair of the Asian Quartodecimans as interpreted by Eusebius, would be bound to have doctrinal implications whenever Rome required doctrinal conformity as the price of communion, via Rome, with the universal Church.
- (2) What is of course true is that evidence for the special doctrinal importance of Rome is exiguous in the early centuries but so is so much else that interests us; we have to rely on data that history happens to have preserved for us, and this depends to a certain extent on what interested Christians in those years of persecution. But one should not pass by without consideration the text of Irenaeus on the subject, disputed though its exegesis is. Nor should one overlook the

fact noted by B.J. Kidd, I think, that early "heretics" flocked to Rome to try to secure sanction for their theories there. Batiffol is not a safe guide on the term, cathedra Petri. The mention of "some Roman emperors" is sudden and odd in this context; and it can be argued that the emperors were only reflecting Christian views. One might surely have mentioned Augustine's causa finita est, if not other texts and data.

(6) N.19: "challenges to such claims" -

But of course authority is always being challenged. What is the evidence for saying that "Eastern Christians regarded Rome as one of several ..."? Of course it was one of several: but wasn't it the one that was of paramount importance? Again, one would want to know what "papal decisions" were challenged by Western metropolitans, and in what circumstances (I take it we are not talking about abusive operations of the primacy in nondoctrinal matters?). That a Pope might "deviate from the faith" is a fact that constat in Catholic theology; the question is whether a Pope can "define", under conditions laid down by Vatican I, and yet be found, in this definition, to be espousing error. This paragraph would have been more satisfactory if it had pin-pointed the quasi-ecumenical occasions when the doctrinal primacy of the Roman see was the issue. mention the Council of Ephesus, whose members acknowledge themselves to be "constrained" (epeichthentes) by that see; the Council of Chalcedon, whose Acts were inoperative till Rome confirmed them; the end of the Acacian Schism, made possible by the acceptance by the Eastern bishops that it was necessary to be in communion with Rome, etc.; and the seventh Ecumenical Council (second of Nicaea) in which it was stated, apparently without contradiction, that no council could be regarded as ecumenical unless it had the approbation or consent of Rome. These examples are not from theological theorising but from the official history of the Church at its topmost (institutional) level.

Cf. also the statement in N.20: "Roman bishops from the fourth century on regarded their "confirmation" etc." The list I have given above suggests that it wasn't only "Roman bishops" who held this view. (That external help was needed for the enforcement of Roman decisions is hardly relevant. Even today the attitude of the secular arm in China has made it impossible for Rome to have its decisions "enforced" in that country). Note, also in N.20, the statement about "the growing practice of appealing to Rome"; what is meant is that evidence for such a practice becomes more abundant — the argumentum ex silentio is here, as so often dangerous.

(7) N.32: "Definitions".

When this word is used by Vatican I (or <u>definire</u>) is a verbal formulation meant, or an act of intellectual judgment which the Pope endeavours to clothe in the words of a formula? Today it seems to be admitted that formulas are not irreformable; but is this admission unfaithful to Vatican I? I suggest that <u>definire</u> means "to settle an issue", not the formula in which the decision is communicated.

(8) N.33(d).

We can be sure that assent to an infallible definition will not be lacking. But the reverse is also true: when such assent is lacking, we can be sure that there was some defect in the actualisation of the conditions laid down by Vatican I - i.e. sure that the "definition" in question is not certainly an infallible definition. Thus reception by the People of God becomes also a criterion.

(9) "No second source".

For me, this matter is still sub judice - I would not wish to be counted among the adherents of the sola scriptura thesis.

(10) N. 31. "Only two".

But when a Pope confirms the "infallible" teaching of a general council, is he not both playing his part as a bishop among bishops and exercising his papal infallibility?

Additional Note:

As usual, the argument limps because there is not yet agreement about the identification and limits of the Church. If the Church has received the permanent gift (presupposing the assistance of the Holy Spirit) of visible unity, then this should reflect back upon our evaluation of the historical evidences, e.g. of the "developments" of papal primacy and papal doctrinal authority. If visible unity, in the shape of full intercommunion between all its local expressions, is not a permanent gift of God to his Church, then I doubt whether we can find reliable criteria anywhere for the articulation of the Tradition. One realises that it could have been most imprudent to treat De Ecclesia at an earlier stage in the dialogue; but ahsn't the time now come when attention should be directed to it?

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