

beyond the permissible." Notable are its condemnation of the idea of a first strike — "We do not perceive any situation in which the deliberate initiation of nuclear warfare, on however restricted a scale, can be morally justified" — and its criticism of the policy of deterrence as a whole. With regard to the latter, it follows Catholic moral teaching in stating that as long as there is hope that negotiations will lead to "meaningful and continuing reductions in nuclear stockpiles, and eventually to the phasing out altogether of nuclear deterrence and the threat of mutually assured destruction," the possession of nuclear weapons may be tolerated as the lesser of two evils. On the other hand, "if that hope were to disappear, the moral attitude of the Catholic Church would certainly have to shift to one of uncompromising condemnation of both use and possession of such weapons." It goes on to cite five "negative dimensions" of any deterrence policy, to conclude that "the arms race, with deterrence as its key element" is "a 'sinful situation, one which must be changed, however long and difficult the task.'" The second draft, which, like its predecessor, has already provoked widespread discussion and controversy in the United States, will be debated by the bishops at their meeting later this month; meanwhile, it is understood that the Administration has asked for a meeting with the drafting committee, which is headed by Archbishop Bernardin of Chicago.

Home news

Victims of hate

Speaking in Belfast on 27 October, Dr Cahal Daly, the newly-installed Bishop of Down and Connor, whose diocese includes Belfast, compared the intensified campaign of violence in Northern Ireland since the elections for the North Ireland Assembly to a madly careering engine which has assumed a momentum and speed of its own. In his address at the funeral of Mr Joseph Donegan, who was murdered by the Ulster Volunteer Force, the bishop said that "there is no difference between Catholic tears and Protestant tears," and he continued: "One crime provokes another answering horror; brutal reprisal is met by still more savage retaliation. We think we have reached the bottom of the pit of degradation when a still deeper level of man's unhumanity is dug." Bishop Daly said there was little hope that the men of violence, who had not paid attention to the appeal made by the Pope in Drogheda in 1979, would listen now: "yet I believe that there where the authors of the dreadful deeds of this past week hide from their crimes or plan further horrors, there are some men who dread being alone with themselves, because this might mean being left alone with their conscience and alone with God." Such people, he felt, might turn away from violence, were it not for the fact that they are entrapped in a system which indoctrinates them constantly in the ways of terrorism and force. According to

Bishop Daly, "revenge and retaliation do not stop or deter violence, they only make it grow more massive and monstrous [and]

those who harbour the evil of murder and hate in their hearts or in their homes become themselves its first victims."

Anglicans and the Pope

Heinrich Fries reproves the Vatican

We publish below, in slightly abbreviated form, a translation of the second part of an article by a former professor of fundamental theology in the Catholic Theological Faculty of the University of Munich. In the first part, Professor Fries noted that in the Final Report of the Anglican-Roman Catholic International Commission (ARCIC), the Anglican Communion had accepted the universal primacy of the Bishop of Rome, which represented, he said, "a total revision of the Anglican tradition." In the second part, he goes on to examine — and find wanting — the criticisms of ARCIC's work offered by the Vatican's Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. His article was composed with the collaboration of Karl Rahner, who states that he is in full agreement with its contents. We publish it here by agreement with *Stimmen der Zeit*, where it previously appeared.

The Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith begins by welcoming the Final Report of the Anglican-Roman Catholic International Commission (ARCIC). It speaks of "an exemplary ecumenical dialogue" and a "notable effort towards reconciliation." However, no explicit reference is made to the concept of the Church as *koinonia* — communion — a concept that is basic to the whole report.

Then follow doubts and objections. The congregation takes issue with the document's claim to "substantial agreement" in the themes discussed. If the term signifies a "fundamental agreement," the congregation cannot agree to this, because *total* harmony has not been attained (but is such total harmony in the area of faith obtainable at all?), and because differences remain which in part concern the faith; and the congregation illustrates this by reference to the papal primacy. Why may one not appeal, on the point, to the "hierarchy of truths"? The congregation says that one may not, but the reason for this is not obvious. It is precisely in the points singled out for objection by the congregation that the idea of the "hierarchy of truths" is relevant.

The Roman Response points to the possibility that the completed texts might be interpreted in different ways, and so be unfit to form the basis of reconciliation in life and practice. Again one may ask: what texts (if any) in scripture or tradition leave no room for differing interpretations? Hence diversity of interpretation is not, as such, the problem, but rather whether the texts involve irreconcilable contradictions that can only be masked by a spurious consensus. The Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith seems to have this fear in regard to ARCIC's Final Report. In what follows our task is to examine whether, and in that way, this applies to the question of the Petrine office.

Criticising the Final Report's interpretation of the Petrine texts, the congregation says that that ARCIC states about Peter's role (that it is a special matter, a matter of special importance) does not measure up to "the truth of faith as this has been

understood by the Catholic Church, on the basis of the principal Petrine texts of the New Testament, and does not satisfy requirements of the dogmatic statement of Vatican Council I: the apostle Peter . . . received immediately and directly from our Lord Jesus Christ a real and proper primacy of jurisdiction."

In reply we must say that the congregation does not fully convey the attitude of the Final Report. The report illustrates Peter's significance as the first of the Twelve through his special calling: Simon is given the name of Peter; his task is to be the Rock of the Church (Mt 16), to confirm the brethren in faith (Lk 22) and to be Christ's Shepherd (Jn 23). It is expressly said that he was the Twelve's spokesman in the confession of Christ's messiahship, that the risen Christ appeared first to him, that the leading role in the council of the apostles belonged to him.

Thus the New Testament's statements about Peter were not incompletely but completely presented by the Final Report. These statements leave us in no doubt (and in what way) a primacy belonged to the apostle Peter. The Final Report speaks of a manifest leadership-role of Peter.

Nevertheless, it is not possible to infer from the Petrine texts, immediately and by themselves, a real papal jurisdictional primacy over the whole Church. To do so would be to demand too much of the texts. A comprehensive analysis would be anachronistic. The unanimous view of today's Catholic exegetes is that on the basis of historical criteria, the so-called Petrine passages of the New Testament cannot be understood in the sense of the institution of a universal primacy for the post-apostolic Church and its equipment with universal jurisdictional plenitude of power. Quite recently Walter Kasper had declared: "It is not disputed among historians that we do not find in the New Testament any unitary ordering of ministry. It is also beyond controversy that we cannot trace back the primacy of the bishop of Rome and the threefold ministry (bishops, priests, deacons) to an immediate institution by the earthly Jesus or the risen Christ."

The so-called Petrine texts were, in the position adopted by the first Vatican Council, used as a basis of a universal primacy of jurisdiction, directly and immediately conferred and conveyed to the apostle by Jesus Christ (*DS* 3053). Accordingly, the ordinary rules applied in Catholic theology, the acceptance of the content of a definition does not require that the biblical or historical grounds offered for the definition must be accepted with an assent of faith as being obligatory or binding interpretations.

Nevertheless, the Final Report in no way deprives the primacy of a biblical basis and a historical foundation. When it says that the New Testament contains no explicit record of the transmission (to successors) of Peter's leadership-role, one cannot disagree. To this statement, however, the report appends the historically important fact that already in very early times a "special responsibility among the churches" was ascribed to the church of Rome and its bishop. It says that a special function of the bishop of Rome was to ensure the unity of the Church and loyalty to the apostolic inheritance and was regarded as an authoritative court of appeal. Can an historian properly say more? Moreover it is added that the fathers and teachers of the Church began to interpret the contents of the New Testament as pointing in this same direction, so that it becomes thinkable that a primacy of the bishop of Rome does not contradict the New Testament and is part of God's plan for the unity and catholicity of his Church.

And when finally the report says that "a universal primacy will be required in a reunited church and should appropriately be the primacy of the bishop of Rome," and that an office modelled on the role of Peter could be a sign and guarantee of unity, one must honestly ask: can one, should one, really expect and demand more than this in an ecumenical dialogue, and does that not suffice for the recognition of the primacy — not, as has been argued, on pragmatic grounds but on grounds of faith?

The *Elucidations to Authority I* (the third of the ARCIC documents) speak explicitly of this (N.8): "According to Christian doctrine, the unity in truth of the Christian community demands visible expression. We agree that such visible expression is the will of God and that the maintenance of visible unity at the universal level involves the *episcopē* of a universal primate. This is a doctrinal statement."

If, as is here the case, the primacy is derived from the being of the Church which is kept by God irrevocably in the truth of God — then an origin from Jesus can be maintained also for the primacy as described in the report: an origin which one can calmly and honestly call *ius divinum*, divine right, even if this divine right is not located in an explicit, juridistically formulated, founding utterance of Jesus.

From an ecumenical point of view, it is to measure the outcome of a dialogue made possible by the greatest commitment and care, simply and immediately by statements from Vatican I and to reach

a verdict, in acceptance and criticism, by that standard? May one, in an ecumenical perspective, even ask if a text meets the tenets of Vatican I? Does that not amount to transforming Vatican I into an absolute non-historical entity? Does it not imperil the dialogue both with the Anglican Church and with the eastern churches? Is this not a preconiliar model? Are not the requirements for unity still further raised — which might be a stimulus but would more probably be a discouragement? Does it not mean defining the ecumenical movement's goal as: "Become such as we are, and then we are all one"? The model here is of a return to the home which those separated from us have abandoned, the home such as it actually is. Such a demand means that the ecumenical goal, as an historically possible reality, becomes an illusion. An ecumenical operation cannot evaluate the non-Roman Catholic partner simply from the stance of one's own Church and ask whether the partner's stance is fully and completely identical with its own; it must subject itself to the apostolic tradition as the valid criterion of ecclesiastical life and teaching; it must subject itself to the common Christian inheritance and above all to Holy Scripture.

In a well-known essay on "Prospects for the Future of Ecumenism," which was published, unaltered, in a recent volume (*Theologische Prinzipienlehre*, Munich 1982), Cardinal Ratzinger says: "It would be a maximum demand of the West to the East, to require recognition of the Roman bishop's primacy to the full extent of its presentation in 1870, and therewith to arrange a practice of the primacy such as has been accepted by the Uniates" (p.207). Speaking of this and other "maximum demands," Cardinal Ratzinger declares that "none of these maximum solutions comprises a real hope of unity" (p.208). What is right for the Orthodox must be fair for the Anglicans.

Something similar can be said concerning the thesis "that the papal primacy derives from direct institution by Jesus Christ" and is therefore "by divine right." This proposition also is taken up in the response of the congregation and compared with the wording of Vatican I; and here again the Final Report is said to be deficient. I have already expounded what can be said about a biblical and historical basis for the primacy. When the Final Report declares that a universal primate is requisite and necessary for the Church as a whole, that it expresses God's will as a sign of, and a service to, the Church's unity, an act of Providence; when it states that the papacy can appeal to Peter's role in the apostolic college, that the primacy is a gift of divine providence, an effect of the Holy Spirit's guidance of the Church — one then asks oneself: are not these explicit and sufficient testimonies that make possible the affirmation that the papacy is an arrangement by "divine right"? The report explicitly declares (and one must fully agree) that there is reason to ask "whether a gap really exists between the assertion of a primacy by divine right (*iure divino*) and

the acknowledgment of its emergence by divine providence (*divina providential*)" (*Ibid.*, 13). Once again, to demand more is to posit an unrealisable maximum requirement and to make the dialogue unnecessarily more difficult.

The congregation further states that "full jurisdictional power over all local churches is an indispensable (*iure divino*) property of the papal office, which can take different forms to meet historical needs, but can never cease to exist." In reply, one must ask more precisely what different form may be envisaged. One must also ask: what does this signify for the ecclesial status of the eastern churches; and how can this assertion be expressed in discussion with the Orthodox, where the problem exists in an acute form? And yet Pope John Paul II has stated that we may reckon upon a reunion with the eastern churches by the year 2000.

The teaching office

The congregation uses similar criteria in regard to the infallibility of the extraordinary teaching office that is connected with the papal primacy. The statements of ARCIC on this matter are as follows: "The maintenance of the Church in truth requires that at certain moments the Church can in a matter of essential doctrine make a decisive judgment which becomes part of its permanent witness" (*Ibid.*, 24). At the universal level the Church can make such decision in general councils, but the universal primate can also speak in a binding way in the Church's name (*Ibid.*, 26). "Although responsibility for preserving the Church from fundamental error belongs to the whole Church, it may be exercised on its behalf by a universal primate" (*Ibid.*, 28).

This affirmation is not properly appreciated in the Observations of the congregation. Rather, it is said that a concept of indefectibility has not the same meaning as the concept of infallibility which Vatican I maintained. But one must rather ask whether the reality intended is to be unconditionally combined with the concept of infallibility, a concept which to a modern mind suggests maximalist interpretations which in fact it does not really demand? What was meant is: safeguarding from error. The word "infallible" can be misunderstood. We should not cling on to it by every means possible, but replace it by a concept less liable to be misunderstood and better fitted to secure agreement — or at least explain it: whether by the concept of indefectibility or by the concept I have for several years propounded: the truth and ultimate binding force of such or such a definition, a proposal which Hans Urs von Balthasar finds thoroughly worthy of consideration.

It has already been remarked that for the Final Report there are still difficulties about the question of papal infallibility. Despite the agreement that a reunited church will need a universal primate, the Anglicans cannot accept the idea that along with the role of the bishop of Rome



The living Spirit

I can tell it in one word, the first of all words: the Church is my mother. Yes, the Church, the whole Church, that of generations past who transmitted her life, her teachings, her witness, her culture, her love to me; and the Church of today. The whole Church, I say, not only the institutional Church, or the Church teaching, or, as we still say, the hierarchical Church that holds the keys confided to her by the Lord. No, more broadly and simply, I mean the 'living Church', working, praying, active and contemplative, remembering and searching, believing, hoping, loving; the daily forger of innumerable links, visible and invisible, between her members; the Church of the humble, close to God; this 'secret army', recruiting from every quarter, braving the periods of decadence, loyal and self-sacrificing, without thought of revolt or even reform, always taking the road that ascends despite a fallen nature that beckons elsewhere, testifying in silence to the continuing fecundity of the gospel and to the already present kingdom. Much more, the entire Church, without distinction, that immense flock of Christians, so many of whom are unaware if their royal priesthood and of the fraternal community they constitute, all this is my mother too.

The Church is my mother because she brings me forth to a new life. She is my mother because her concern for me never slackens, any more than do her efforts to deepen that life in me, however unenthusiastic my co-operation. And though in this life may be a fragile and timid growth, I have seen its full flowering in others. I have seen it. I have touched it. I can, and will, vouch categorically for it. I am not deaf to the reproaches directed against my mother (truth to tell there are times when I am deafened by them), nor do I fail to see the justice of some of them. But I assert that therefore the evidence I have just presented all of them — and any others you care to add — are without force and will always remain so. Just as the Church is entirely concentrated in the Eucharist, it may also be said to be entirely concentrated in a saint. For here is the wonder of it: if my eyes had not always been aware of it, I would not have known what to look at. I would not have known how to see, this beauty most rare, most improbable, most disconcerting (because, as I said, so wholly beyond imagining). What I saw was not the highest imaginable accomplishment of human perfection, nor was it supernatural wisdom . . . that even if its radiance had shone through but one human being it would have created a bias in favour of its divine source. In a saint, I saw the whole Church pass.

Henri de Lubac, *The Church, Paradox and Mystery*.

there is likewise given *a priori* the guaranteed endowment of a gift of divine assistance in judging doctrines, "by virtue of which his formal decisions can be known to be wholly assured before their reception by the faithful" (*Ibid.*, 31). The document adds that the question of reception is difficult and cannot be mechanically or statistically applied.

In today's theology increased attention has been paid to the problem of reception. Referring to general councils, Georg Kretschmar speaks of a "circle": "The Church as a whole adopts something which a council has formulated as faith; that the Church can do this is only possible on the presupposition of its orthodoxy. The circle can only be resolved if in both council and church-as-a-whole the one Spirit of God is at work, and if both council and church-as-a-whole are conscious of themselves as subject to the apostolic word."

A similar principle can be applied to papal *ex cathedra* definitions. The process of reception occurs not as a result of mechanical assent and adoption, but as a result of communication, through which what is propounded is realised and appropriated as binding in faith by a living community. Hence even on the Catholic side it can be said that reception can be seen as the surest sign that in the actual case in question one is dealing with a true and binding doctrinal decision covered by the special promise of Christ and that the conditions necessary for it to be a true expression of the faith.

Certainly it is true to say with Cardinal Ratzinger that "the pope does not merely ratify a process of reception but, against the background of the Church's faith, has the right to issue definitive decisions and interpretations." But perhaps even in reception, as here named, what is meant is not very different from the background or context of faith which finds its linguistic shape in a possible definition. For the definition can only and must only be the expression and vocalisation of the believed faith of the Church. In a discussion with Hans Küng I contested his argument that there "are *a priori, ipso facto* guaranteed, infallible papal definitions of doctrine. The pope's definitions ensue *a posteriori*. Vatican II declares: "In such a case the Roman pontiff does not utter a pronouncement as a private person, but rather he expounds and defends the teaching of the Catholic faith as the supreme teacher of the universal Church, in whom the Church's charism of infallibility is present in a singular way" (LG 25).

This is not contradicted by the fact that Vatican I declared that the pope's dogmatic definitions are irrefutable in themselves, not because of the Church's consent (*ex sese, non ex consensu ecclesiae, irreformabiles*). This statement has an anti-gallican aim and rejects the opinion that an *ex cathedra* papal definition that satisfies the necessary given conditions must be yet again and subsequently subject to another legal test, for example, a national bishops' conference. Yet no one who sees this formula (repeated without comment by

Vatican II) in its historical context would fail to understand that *non ex consensu ecclesiae* does not imply that the Pope can be isolated from and independent of the Church in his definitions.

A closer treatment of the Final Report's Elucidations and the Congregation's Observations on the primate and his teaching function could provide useful material for a study of the two methods of theological argument current today. One method knows already, when it begins to argue, the proposition that is to be proved, expressed in clear, universal, juridical and formal terms. It mentions a quite determinate single scriptural proposition, and then discerns "intuitively" that in this biblical text is precisely uttered what is meant by the dogmatic statement that the method has to prove. It feels that the two statements differ only in linguistic formulation, not in expressed content. Matthew 16 and Vatican I, then, say precisely the same thing. According to this purely verbal argument there is no point in asking why so many centuries elapsed before the dogmatic statement evolved from the biblical text.

The second method takes an historical and critical line. In a way it re-lives the historical process which has led from the biblical text to the dogmatic definition. Throughout, it respects the sense and meaning of the biblical text, but it sees it in its more immediate and in its wider context; perhaps it sees at once the implications given in the text, which must be carefully and prudently made explicit. So it cannot, as simply as the first method can, evaluate the New Testament words as constituting a legal decree. It does not object if someone understands Matthew 16 as a founding charter of the papacy. But it sees this evaluation of the text as the result of a long learning process, reached by reflections in the real history of the Church's faith-consciousness. It therefore deems it important to examine other scriptural passages that are significant for a judgment on Peter's role and the Church's self-understanding. All these separate data have to be patiently assembled in laborious work. For this method it is necessary not to overlook the difference in the several stages of the actual growth of the theology of primacy.

These two theological methods need not feel themselves to be at loggerheads, each simply excluding the other. The first could be conceived as the dogmatic method, the second as the method obtaining in fundamental theology. They could be shown to be different and yet at one, as are dogmatic and fundamental theology.

Ecumenical dialogue

In conclusion we may quote two passages in which, in remarkable ways, criteria are developed for ecumenical dialogue wherever, and with whomsoever, it is practised.

The first of these occurs in the Ecumenical Decree of the Synod of Würzburg: "Pastoral Cooperation of the Church

ches, a Service for Christian Unity":

"The assent of full faith to God's revelation is required unconditionally. This is expressed by the Church in her ordinary extraordinary preaching of doctrine, in which she herself is subordinate. Hence the communion in faith between churches is not possible when one church perceives herself as bound to reject, as contrary to revelation, a doctrine that is obligatory in the other church. On the other hand the Catholic Church does not demand of its members that they similarly affirm every application of and deduction from the faith as taught and lived. Still less does it expect this of other Christians. In this area there opens up a large field of ecumenical possibilities, to be explored in dialogue with the churches. And it would be open further to ask within what limits a union might be possible, such that "one Church can respect and recognise the other's tradition as a permissible unfolding of revelation even though it will not adopt this tradition for itself (for example particular forms of eucharistic devotions and venerations of saints, sacramentals, indulgences)"

The second passage comes from Joseph

Ratzinger's Graz Lecture (referred to above) which the author republished in 1982. There we read: "On the basis of Catholic theology one certainly cannot simply affirm that the doctrine of the primacy is null and void, even though one tries to understand the objections against it and with open eyes appreciates the increasing weight of historical ascertainments. *On the other hand one cannot regard the nineteenth- and twentieth-century modality of that primacy as the only possible modality and as essential for all Christians.* Paul VI's symbolic gestures (concluding with his genuflection to the representative of the Ecumenical Patriarch) were exactly intended to express this, and by such signs to get us out of the bottleneck of the past. Though it is not in our power to halt the historical process and go back through the centuries, one can yet say that what was possible for 1,000 years cannot today be from a Christian stance impossible. Anyhow, in 1054 AD Humbert of Silva Candida, in the very bull in which he excommunicated the patriarch Cerularius and so started the East-West schism, described the Emperor and citizens of Constantinople as 'very Christian and orthodox,'

though their idea of the Roman primacy was certainly closer to Cerularius's than, shall we say, to that of Vatican I. In other words: *Rome must not require from the East more as regards a doctrine of the primacy than was formulated and lived in the first millennium.* When on the occasion of the Pope's visit to the Phanar (25 July 1976), Patriarch Athenagoras addressed him as Peter's successor, as 'the first in honour amongst us,' as the one who presides over the charity [the universal communion], this great church-leader was reproducing in words the essential context of the first millennium's statements on the primacy, and *more than this Rome must not demand.* Union in this case rests on the basis that the East, for its part, would give up opposing the second millennium western development as heretical, and accept the Catholic Church as legitimate and orthodox in the shape in which this development has put it; while on the other hand the West would recognise the Eastern Church in the shape which it has preserved, as orthodox and legitimate" (209).

Should not what is here said about the Eastern Church hold good also for the Anglican Church?