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The Sacrament of the Good Creation

by Donald J. Keefe, S.J.

In this paper I wish to propose the outline of a biblical theology of the good creation, in parallel with a sacramental theology whose roots are Augustinian. No more can be undertaken in the space at hand; to provide even so much will require a broad brush. The foundation thus indicated is nonetheless necessary if the question of the possibility of ordaining women to the Catholic priesthood is not to be trivialized by its reduction to less than theological dimensions.

The controlling theme of this theology, that by which the creation which is its subject is specified as good, is the biblical notion of covenant. To speak of this as a single notion is clearly to endorse a controverted view of the term itself, and of the biblical revelation: the covenant is taken to be an historical unity, to the extent that the marital interpretation of the covenant, as this is discovered in Hoseah, the Wisdom literature and Trito-Isaiah in the Old Testament, and in the Lucan, Pauline and Johannine material particularly in the New Testament, is integral to and finally normative for the meaning of this symbol, and so for the meaning of the good creation. The unity of the revelation requires the unity of the symbols of marriage and covenant with that of the good creation: in brief, it is precisely by the mediation of a maritally-structured covenant that God is present to creation, and that creation is given as good. As will be seen, this divine presence and mediation is historical; by it, God is revealed as the Lord of history.¹

Immediately associated with these themes is that of the worship which is sacrifice; as employed in the New Testament, the focus of this symbol is Eucharistic, for it points, as Augustine tells us, to the Body of Christ, sancta societas qua inhaeremus Deo.² Paul affirms this Body to be in a marital

union with her Head, explicitly referring this union to the "one flesh" of Adam and Eve in the Jahwist creation account, a reference already presaged in the designation of Christ as the Second Adam. These symbols of creation, sacrifice and marital covenant coalesce in the Eucharist, the creative union, una caro, of him who is God with his covenanted and elect people, the Bridal Church.³

The mediatorial character of the covenant is crucial to its comprehension. Without it, the marital interpretation of an immediate relation between the divine and the human must place sexuality in God, setting up a primordial dualism between irreconcilables, or in the alternative a primordial monism in which one pole or the other of the God-man polarity is reduced to illusion and non-being. Primitive paganism chose the first option; with an increasing sophistication, the great Eastern world-religions chose one version of the second, as in the Upanishadic theology, whose spirit informs monastic Buddhism as well; as in the cosmological ethos of Taoism, quite similar to that of the Stoics, and as in contemporary Zen Buddhism, whose notion of satori continues to express the despair of history it inherited from the Hindu understanding of salvation as extinction, nirvana. In the post-Christian west, Hegel followed the path of the Enlightenment in choosing to suppress not man but God; that monism, whether as secularism or as Marxism, now dominates much of the western experience of existence, informing its public expression with a fundamental alienation from all that can be called God. Man cannot bear immediacy with God: Moses knew this, and the history of religions confirms the biblical insight.

The covenant is then the mediation of God to his creation, to humanity, to history; only when the covenant is thus understood is the creation which it specifies experienced as good. As a mediation, the covenant is a created and human reality, one given in history, by which God is in history, the Lord of

history. The dilemmas posed by the Old Testament faith in the Lord of history find no sufficient resolution in the Old Testament; they await the concrete union of God and man, Christus integer,⁴ the New Covenant, for there alone is the dichotomy resolved which haunts our fallen reason: that dichotomy which has found, perennially, the immanence of God to be in contradiction with His transcendence.

The theological treatment of the New Covenant has been afflicted by a kind of Christomonism, a mistake which is perpetuated in much of the discussion of the ordination of women, but which is far older than that discussion. This mistake consists, precisely, in ignoring the marital structure of covenant, particularly of the New Covenant, and consequently attempting to understand it in terms of the hypostatic union of divinity and humanity in the Christ. Part of this confusion is due to an ancient distrust of the goodness of sexuality;⁵ another considerable part of it may be assigned to the "real presence" reaction to the Berengarian controversy, a reaction which thereafter ignored the bi-polar structure of that presence,⁶ and a third contributor to this distortion may be the general decline of Augustinian influence in Roman Catholicism, at least, following Leo XIII's encyclical establishing Thomism in Catholic theology.⁷ The mistake is of course reinforced by the Protestant Reformation; there the Christomonist tendency is pushed to the point that the Christ's historicity extinguishes the historicity of the Church, by exhausting in his own deed on the Cross the entirety of historical significance. This has the consequence of rejecting the Augustinian notion of sacrifice--a rejection already largely complete in Catholic theology--and reducing it to a kind of immolation quite distinct from the Eucharistic presence. Catholic theology has some time since began to recover from this notion of sacrifice, but hardly to the point of recovering the Augustinian insight which identifies sacrifice as the establishment

of the sancta societas, the Body whose relation to the Christ, the Head, is marital, not organic as Thomas thought.⁸

When the covenant is the presence, both mediatorial and marital, of the Lord of history in the historical creation, in the people of God, it is clear that this presence must be free if it is to be historical; a divine immanence ex machina, so to speak, cannot be historical, for it is neither human nor free. Here the Catholic doctrines of the communicatio idiomatum and of the creation of Mary in integrity, as graced with an unfallen freedom, at once illumine and are illumined by this understanding of the New Covenant. In Christian retrospect, it can be seen that it is only by his union with humanity that God can be immanent in history; this union requires his human conception through the free consent of a woman if it is to be truly historical, truly human. Such freedom is impossible to fallenness: only an integral freedom may utter Mary's Fiat; absent such freedom, Christ's humanity is despotically imposed upon our own, in contradiction to his Lordship and to the covenant by which it is exercised. The Immaculate Conception is thus no product of an extravagant piety; it is the condition of possibility of God's immanence in history. The integrity which is hers gratia Christi is precisely the created correlative to the Son's immanence in creation, i.e., to her son's humanity: in this correlation, the Good Creation consists, and it is in terms of this correlation that humanity is created in the image of God.⁹ We cannot here delay upon the Trinitarian theology implicit in this imaging: suffice it to say that the analogy between the Covenant, so viewed, and the Trinity is strict, and has been too long ignored. We have seen the pertinence of Mary's integral freedom to the Covenant; it remains to examine the pertinence of the communicatio idiomatum. It may be best to signal this by reference to a common view that the Christ's divine Sonship is independent of Mary's virginity, in the sense that

it is not because Jesus had no human father that He is the eternal Son. There is a sense, quite an abstract one, in which this is true: the ideas of human and divine Sonship are obviously distinct. In the concrete the case is quite different: Mary's virginal motherhood is indissociable from Jesus' unique Sonship, his eternal origin in the Father; it is also indissociable from and implicit in her own unfallenness, a matter to be touched upon later. The communicatio idiomatum is a rule of faith which reflects the unity of the Christ; it requires that any concrete statement about him respect that unity-- a unity discovered after some centuries of dispute to be personal, that of the Person who is the Son. By this rule, Mary must be said to be the mother of the Son who is God: Theotokos. This divine Person, at once man and God, has a unique Father, who is God, the arche. That there are not two sons, one human, one divine, has been settled since the late 4th century;¹⁰ that there are not "two fathers" is only corollary. The personal unity of the Incarnate Son simply excludes from his history any human father, quite as the title of Theotokos, given Mary at Ephesus, excludes a divine mother. The integral femininity of Mary is turned totally to her Son, as his integral masculinity is turned to her. Historical language, responsive to fallen existence, confirms its fragmented condition, by articulating it in clear and distinct ideas: fallen femininity is splintered into mutually exclusive categories of relation to the masculine: virgin, mother, daughter, bride, sister--these in their integrity are unitary, but in their fallenness they respond only to equally broken aspects of a fallen masculinity: husband, bridegroom, brother, father, son. Such correlations as our fallenness permits are inadequate to constitute the sancta societas, the marital covenant by which we are redeemed: that sacrifice is actual only in the correlation of the plenitude of the feminine and the masculine, a correlation completed on the Cross, re-presented thereafter in the Eucharistic

worship of the Church. The actuality of this sacrifice is that of the redeemed, unfallen and integral creation, the New Covenant, in which the truth of our humanity is gratefully received and celebrated as the central and sustaining meaning of all history, all existence as human, as man and as woman. It therefore grounds the significance of our fallenness, making it sacramental even in its fragmentariness, holy even in its brokenness, free even in its concupiscence. To be a man, to be a woman, is to live toward an eschatological destiny, toward a fulfillment beyond all fallen calculation or anticipation, to which its sacramental and marital symbolization relates as the Eucharistic Presence does to the glory of the Risen Christ in his Kingdom.

It is clear enough that the theology sketched here is entirely dependent upon the truth of the Church's confession of Jesus as the eternal Son of God the Father. It is also clear that this confession is reinforced, in a manner little discussed, by the recognition of Mary as the Mother of God. It has been suggested of recent years that such language as Son and Father is a consequence of a quite dispensable historical and sociological conditioning: to this it may be replied that a historical faith is a priori committed to the historical mediation of God to man, and to the validity of the historical response to that mediation: this mutuality, this correlation, is the Covenant. It may be abandoned, but it can hardly be subjected to superior oversight, to a higher wisdom.

The masculine-feminine polarity which is the structure of the Covenant, of the Good Creation, is thus of the most fundamental importance to the whole of Catholic doctrine and worship. The language of subordination by which this polarity is designated is rooted in the Trinitarian subordination of the Son to the Father, and so carries with it no implication of ontological inferiority. What the masculine is, is in its totality actual by a holistic reference and donation to the feminine; the feminine is real and actual and true in a

reciprocal self-donation to the masculine: neither possesses any autonomous significance. This is the revelation of the Covenant, Old and New; it is the experience of the worship of the Church, and so, of the Good Creation. This experience is radically Eucharistic, marital, sacramental, and sacrificial--an appropriation of freedom, and so an appropriation of historical existence. To this there is no actual alternative: to reject it is to choose to be less, not merely other; it is to ratify one's own fallenness, to prefer one's damnation to the worship which is the only authentic significance which history possesses. Such a refusal is a radical rejection of every human value in return for an abstract autonomy, whose abstract character is then reified in the construction of a non-historical Utopia, a refuge from the experienced absurdity of historical existence. This experience is the perennial alternative to the Judaeo-Christian faith in the Lord of history: it refuses all mediation of the divine, and returns to the ancient dichotomies, from whose vantage point all subordination, and therefore all qualitative differentiation, is injustice, alienation.

The option of historical faith, presented by the revelation of the Lord of history in the Old Covenant and the New, is of a radically optimistic experience, an experience of order in history under God. This experience is not of alienation, but of mutuality: the mutuality of love. This mutuality could only be discovered to man by a divine initiative, for it is the relation of God to man that is normative; left to himself, man can speak only of his own ambivalence, whether by the symbolism of a religious despair of historical salvation, or by the scientific reduction of our qualitative alterity to quantitative identity. The revelation of God's prior love for man is simultaneously the revaluation, the validation, of all that is finite and historical, for the divine transcendence is revealed precisely by God's immanence in man and man's

history. The primordial antagonism between the divine and the human, which is the topic of all the pagan mythologies, is undone by this immanence, and the mythic symbols, redeployed, speak no longer of an irredeemable contestation between the divine and the human, between time and eternity, between the relative and the absolute, between transcendence and immanence, between unity and multiplicity; these ancient expressions of our ambivalence are refuted by God's historical manifestation of his love, at once creative, covenantal, sacrificial and marital. Henceforth these symbols utter forth God's love for his creation, and the created response to that love. This is the symbolic expression, in the transvaluation of time which is historical existence, of the new experience of order under God in history; it is an expression which is identical with what it expresses: the presence of God, finally recognized as Trinitarian, to his people. These symbols then are creative, constitutive, sacramental; their unity is the Eucharistic worship of the Church, the creation, continually renewed, of the covenanted history, of the experience of God's marital love for his covenanted creation, a creation which by that love is given, and is good.

If the bi-polar and marital mediation of God's covenant is forgotten or ignored, creation begins to be experienced as evil; it becomes necessary to nullify it in order to achieve union with God. Absent this marital mediation, understood Biblically as a positive mutuality between nonetheless irreducible polarities, and so as a mutuality which is revelatory of the divine and creative of the human, the intrinsic duality of the finite becomes rationalized and dichotomous, so that the polar principles by which finitude ~~are~~ given are understood to be mutually exclusive and competitive rather than mutually implicatory and sustaining. The close, even strict, connection between an ambivalent experience of the world and the ambivalent experience of marriage is manifest in the history of religions; wherever the coming to be of the

world (cosmogony) is symbolized by the wedding of antagonistic primordial principles which are to each other as masculine and feminine, the cosmos is understood to have an immanent and feminine principle of evil. This dualism of irreconcilable polarities rests finally upon a simultaneous percept of the relation between the sexes, and of the cosmos itself, as irremediably contested.

As von Rad and Voegelin have remarked,¹¹ a different experience of existence is then at work than that which has nourished the Jewish and Christian scriptures. These speak of a good creation, with no immanent principle of evil; they speak of it as covenantal, and at the same time as marital, revealing thereby a positive valuation of the marriage relation unknown to extra-Judaeo-Christian religious and post-religious societies. The banishing of cosmic pessimism is simultaneously the recognition not only of a good creation, but of a good God. The divine and the human are no longer met in a relation whereby the fullness of the one is the diminution of the other, for the divine omnipotence is no longer understood as necessarily suppressive of the human, but creative, and creative, precisely, of the masculine-feminine polarity of marriage, of the human mutuality in freedom and responsibility which is sacramental worship and historical existence.

History is then no longer seen as erosive of reality, as that from which one must retreat, whether by recourse to a mimetic ritual or to the rationalist nullifications of all human differentiation which are ideologies. History, as inseparable from the sacramental and symbolic worship of the Lord of history, is now salvific, and the Biblical record of that worship, of salvation history, has within it no immanent principle of disintegration; "historical conditioning" is constitutive, not erosive, of the Biblical revelation. We return thus to the point from which this discussion began: the unity of the historical revelation of the covenant, which is not undone by its own historicity. Rather,

the Judaeo-Christian revelation, the immanence of God in creation, is that by which its time is released from a cyclic futility, to be time qualified by covenant and sacrifice. The significance of historical conditioning cannot be other than salvific, for history has no other signification than this.

Such a sacramental ontology, it would seem, is demanded by the Catholic tradition. It is the Protestant resistance to its symbolization in history which sets off the Reformation tradition from the Catholic, and which constitutes the central problem for ecumenical theology. What is at issue is so radical, so central, as to pervade the entirety of theological discussion; this center cannot be other than Christological, other than ecclesiological, other than Eucharistic. It is the meaning of the New Covenant which is in dispute. The position taken in this dispute controls the quite ancillary question of the ordination of women.

Because God's immanence in humanity which is the Father's sending of the Son to give the Holy Spirit is mediated by an irreducible created polarity whose structure is that of the marital "one flesh," a structure anticipated in the Old Covenant and given irrevocably in the New, certain consequences necessarily follow. In the first place, as has been seen, the union between Christ and his Church is not organic, so as to constitute a single subject, but as marital is a relationship between two subjects. Further, this Christ-Church relation, as sacramentally symbolized by Christian marriage, is understood by the deuterio-Pauline and Catholic tradition as validating, making to be eschatologically significant or sacramental, the historical relation of the sexes in Christian marriage. This in turn entails that the sacramental significance of human freedom, thus exercised, must be affirmed: no "total corruption" doctrine of the Fall is possible, and Luther's notion of a servile will is equally out of place, for it permits no correlation between divine and

human freedom which marriage might symbolize. Consequently, Christ's historical immanence, to which the integral freedom of an historical woman was indispensable, cannot be understood as evacuating or absorbing all human historical significance, as Luther's exegesis of Gal 3:28¹² requires. The members of the Church are therefore, in their union with God, immediately involved in the responsibility of historical worship, of qualified freedom, whose significance is eschatological because it is sacramental. This requires, minimally, that such worship is responsive to, because it is within, the structure of the good creation, and that the masculine-feminine marital polarity be integral to historical worship as it is to the good creation.

When this polarity is thus integral to the Eucharistic liturgy, it demands that the polar components of the Eucharistic sacrifice, the sacrificium crucis and the sacrificium laudis of, respectively, Christ and the Church, be irreducible to each other. Their union is that of the "one flesh" of Gen 2:24 and Eph 5:31. This Eucharistic liturgy is understood, within the Catholic tradition, to be the immanent cause of the Church, which is Church as the Bride of Christ: in this Christ-Church mutuality, the creating cause is the Father's mission of the Son to give the Spirit: what is caused is the "one flesh," the sancta societas qua inhereamus Deo. The ecclesial pole of this sacrifice, whose model is Marial, is summed up in her "Let it be done to me according to your Word;" this exercise of Spirit-empowered freedom is that by which the Church is historical, and is inseparable from the existence of the Church, as it is from Mary's. The Church is therefore ontologically posterior to the sacrificium crucis precisely as Mary's existence is to the Incarnation. There is then no more possibility of the Church's providing for the Eucharist than there is of Mary's providing for the Incarnation. The freedom of the Church, as of Mary, is indispensable to the immanence in her of the Christ, but this indispensability

cannot be converted into the dispensability of the sacrificium crucis, for which no act of the Church can be the surrogate. If the sacrificium crucis is immanent in the Church's worship, as the Catholic doctrine maintains, it must be so on another basis than that of identity. This, at bottom, is the meaning of the doctrine of the episcopal succession to the apostolic munus of offering the sacrificium crucis in persona Christi. The cause of the Church cannot rest upon the authority of the Church. When it is the Church which is considered to be the proper subject of this apostolic succession, then either Christ as risen is removed from history, so that there is no question of a sacrificium crucis in the Mass, or the Church's worship and Christ's sacrifice merge into a unity which has no relation to a marital symbol. The unity is then either taken to be ineffable, which amounts to a return to the absent Christ, or it is understood according to some social paradigm other than the marital, so that the Church and its worship are relativized by a prior sociology. This was the mistake of the medieval theologians' equation of the Church with the "perfect society," whereby the Church found its cause in an Aristotelian rationale, not in the Eucharist.¹³ Comparable paradigms or "models" are widely used today, for the same reason: the Eucharistic origin of the Church is ignored. Commonly, the anti-sacramental implications of such ecclesiologies then emerge, and the relation between the Church and its historical worship begins to fail. The failure may be compensated for, temporarily, by such rational devices as the juridicalization of that worship through its reduction to an obedience, as was done in the period of the so-called baroque theology. Such compensatory mechanisms exhibit at least a recognition that sacramental worship is indispensable to the Church. But in our own time, the failure of the relation between sacramentalism and Church is understood as normative in a large part of the Anglo- and Roman Catholic theological academy: Christ is thought to be present to the

Church sola fide, and there is a considerable discomfiture over the Catholic commitment, reaffirmed at Vatican II, to the primacy of the Eucharistic presence.¹⁴ The controversy over the ordination of women has the considerable merit of forcing a re-examination of the Catholic commitment to Eucharistic realism, with its very broad range of implication. One frequently reads that the confrontation between sola fide and ex opere operato approaches to the Church's worship are obsolete;¹⁵ in view of the evident revival of precisely that controversy in the context of women's orders, the announced reconciliation seems rather illusory than actual. In the final analysis, the matters which divided Christians in the century of the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation continue to do so today, with the added complication that the division is now intrinsic to Catholic theology faculties. In those faculties, at least insofar as they are found in the United States, the Reformation's antagonism to the sacramentality of marriage and to the sacrificium crucis aspect of the Eucharist is well advanced, which is only to say that contemporary Catholic theology, like the medieval, is blind to the marital character of the good creation, of the New Covenant, of the Eucharistic worship, and of our imaging of God.

This oblivion is again given a sociological expression, whereby the manifest ontological and liturgical equality and dignity of masculine and feminine persons is provided with an egalitarian interpretation, in which the religious value of all historical differentiation is discounted. It is evident that marriage, the sacrament by which the dignity of our sexual existence is affirmed par excellence to be liturgical, cannot survive such an interpretation; it is equally evident that if one is committed to the sacramentality of marriage, the subordinationist interpretation of the complementarity of the sexes cannot stand. Gradually, the sacramentality of marriage is giving way; in our marriage tribunals in the Roman Catholic dioceses of this country, a practice has emerged

in which the reality of the sacrament is seen as more and more ideal, less and less capable of realization in a fallen and sinful world.¹⁶ That this practice is consistent with the egalitarian and subordinationist interpretation of the marital covenant is clear enough: the eschatological reduction of an "unjust" sexual differentiation to a monadic unity is integral with those ancient mistakes. With such a mentality in the ascendant, it is not astonishing that the reduction of the Catholic tradition to an ideological simplicity should proceed apace: the entirety of its foundation has been prepared. When the qualitative differentiations of historical existence are desacramentalized, refused religious and liturgical significance, the only remaining differentiation of religious existence is that of number, whose concrete expression is not goodness or beauty, but power. Differentiations in liturgical signification are then understood to be by reason of irrational, because nonidentical, and therefore unjust, distributions of power. The only morality which can then be sought is that of quantitative identity, numerical unity, whether envisioned in terms of absolute multiplicity or absolute and monist unity, in terms then of the absolute value of the individual or of the absolute value of the collectivity. In either guise, absolution from the sin of injustice requires an absolutism of the monad, whether as "person" or as "society." Such a search for absolution has already evacuated the Christian mystery; worship is reduced to the search for this sort of justice, for an increasingly important number of supposedly Catholic intellectuals, not least those concerned for the ordination of women. Scarcely any reasoned advocacy of such ordination exists which does not rely upon this notion of justice, which does not rely upon Luther's exegesis of Galatians to support the abolition of the religious significance of the marital relation, which does not presuppose the nullification of the Catholic tradition by the higher, non-historical truth of historical-critical method. Even Karl Rahner's venture in

this field is of this stamp: the Church's tradition has lost its prescriptive value by its subjection to the procedural proprieties of a formal debate.¹⁷

In another place I have spelled out the theological connections which link the marital character of the Eucharistic sacrifice to the masculine symbolism inherent in the in persona Christi office of the priest in the Mass, and shall not repeat what is there set out in sufficient detail.¹⁸ It has been rather my purpose in these pages to point to the fundamental issues which control the debate over the meaning of orders; of these there is none more fundamental than that of the sacramentality of marriage as illumined by the increasingly explicit marital structure of the Old and New Covenants, by which the goodness and beauty of creation may alone be understood and appropriated. The radical act of this appropriation is worship, whose fulfillment in history is the Eucharistic sacrifice, in which the plenitude of the good creation is celebrated. This plenitude is marital, and it underwrites the sacramentality of human existence. The decision that this marital emphasis within the traditional Catholic liturgy is inherently unjust invokes another religious experience than the Catholic; it is one lavishly explored in our own time by a host of thinkers united by a common rejection of salvation history and a consequent recourse to human autonomy and the salvation available to man thus understood. In the west, this stance is as old as the Orphic religious tradition out of which the Greek philosophers and tragedians worked; much older statements of the same pessimism are available from such Babylonian sources as the Enuma elish. It has attained no higher expression than that of the Timaeus, in which Plato spelled out the eternal antagonism between primordial masculine and feminine cosmological principles.¹⁹

That the cosmological experience of a divine immediacy to a world ultimately incapable of redemption from its opacity was not ignoble is manifest, for our

own world is still illumined by the splendor of the pagan achievement. Nonetheless, this experience of radically ambivalent existence in a world whose evil can be expunged only by its own annulment is one from which Catholic Christianity demands an explicit conversion. It is no longer possible, given the Christian experience of salvation history, to rest in that once-inevitable melancholy. If for anyone today it remains unthinkable that the historical mediation of the Good News should be by way of a maritally-structured covenant, it may be that the incongruity thus discovered is not other than a personal confrontation with the challenge which Catholicism perennially offers to the world.

The issue before us is not really a theological one, freely disputable within the Catholic tradition. For this final and perhaps alarming proposition two kinds of evidence are available. The first of these is the obvious lack of such dispute: the years since the question of the ordination of women began to be broached in Catholic circles have seen no serious attempt between the adversary parties to find a common theological ground upon which such a dispute could be based. Each side finds the other's statements unworthy of serious consideration: parties are formed, not schools. The second kind of evidence consists in the entirely Protestant conclusions as to the Church, the Eucharist, the nature of Orders, the meaning of apostolicity, and the religious value of history which have been explicitly associated with the advocacy of women's orders, and to which you have already been referred.²⁰ To blind oneself to such facts does ecumenism no service. We have to do here with a standing dispute between Catholicism and the Christianity of the Reformation. Until this is recognized, no serious theological discussion will take place.

Donald J. Keefe, S.J.
Marquette University

FOOTNOTES

¹Dennis McCarthy, Old Testament Covenant: A survey of current opinions, John Knox Press, Richmond, Va., 1972; see also Johannes Betz, Der Eucharistie in der Zeit der griechischen Väter, Band ii/i, Die Realpräsenz des Leibes und Blutes Jesu in Abendmahl nach dem Neuen Testament, 2nd ed., Herder, Freiburg, Basel, Wien, 1964, 64ff., 72ff.

²St. Augustine, De civitate dei, x, 6.

³Henri de Lubac, Corpus Mysticum: L'Eucharistie et l'église au Moyen Age. Étude historique. Deuxième édition, revue et augmentée. Aubier, Editions Montaigne, Paris, 1949, 139-209.

⁴St. Augustine, Serm. 341, ch. 9 & 11 (P.L. 39/1499); In Joann. tract. 21 De unitate ecclesiae, ch. 8 (P.L. 35/1568); Epist. contra Donat., ch. 4 (P.L. 33/395-96); see also de Lubac, op. cit., 64-65 et passim.

⁵Gregory of Nyssa, In Cantica Cantorum, hom. 7, (P.G. 44/916b), cited in Grégoire de Nyse, La création de l'homme, intro. et trad. de Jean Laplace, S.J., notes de Jean Danielou, S.J., Editions du Cerf, Paris, Editions de L'Abeille, Lyon, 1943, 56. Gregory here anticipates Luther's exegesis of Gal 3:28, according to which the eschatologically-redeemed good creation is sexless. For the same notion in contemporary guise, see Wayne Meeks, "The Image of the Androgyne: some uses of a symbol in earliest Christianity," History of Religions xii, 3 (Feb., 1974) 165-208, and that line of argument for the ordination of women which relies upon an androgynous reading of the patristic maxim, Quod non assumptus, non sanatus est, instanced by the Center for Concern "memo" of 18 February, 1977, "Womens' Ordination and the Catholic Church" in which Sr. Elizabeth Carroll, R.S.M., states her objections to the reaffirmation of the traditional opposition to the ordination of women which the Congregation of the Doctrine for the Faith had published a month earlier. H. U. von Balthazar pointed out the gnostic roots of this mentality in Liturgie cosmique: Maxime le confesseur, tr. L. Haument et H.-A. Prentout, Aubier, Editions Montaigne, Paris, 1947, 127-50. The coincidence of the flight from sexuality and the flight from history is a commonplace; see M. Eliade, Mephistopheles and the Androgyne, Sheed and Ward, New York, 1966.

⁶de Lubac, op. cit., 184ff.

⁷Leo XIII, Aeterni Patris (Aug. 4, 1879); see Denziger-Schonmetzer *3139.

⁸Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica iii, q.76. See also S.T. iii, q.73, a.1, ob.2. Earlier, St. Thomas had found a "duplex res sacramenti" (in the sense of res et sacramentum): see In IV Sent., d.12, where the Church, together with Christ, is res sacramenti; this is explained by the concomitance of the Body with the Head. But for St. Thomas this concomitance is thought of as organic rather than as marital; further, the concomitant presence of the Church in the Eucharistic opus operatum (res et sacramentum) does not enter into Thomas' account of transubstantiation, and seems to be of no intrinsic interest to the Eucharistic theology which is developed in the Summa Theologica iii, qq.62-78. Concerning this, see de Lubac, op. cit. 274-77.

⁹Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics iii/1, ed. G. Bromley & T. Torrance, University of Edinburgh Press, 1961, 183-206, esp. 197-98.

¹⁰A. Grillmeier, Christ in the Christian Tradition, vol. 1, From the Apostolic Age to Chalcedon (451), 2nd revised edition, John Knox Press, Atlanta, 1975, 352-60.

¹¹Eric Voegelin, Order in History, vol. 2, The World of the Polis, Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, La., 1957, 16, 19; Gerhard von Rad, Wisdom in Israel, Abingdon Press, Nashville and New York, 1972, 190 ff., 303 ff.: Old Testament Theology, vol. 1, Harper and Row, n.d., 448-452.

¹²Gunther Bornkamm, Luthers Auslegen der Galatersbrief, Walter de Gruyter & Co., Berlin, 1963, 277-80.

¹³de Lubac, op. cit., 125-35.

¹⁴E.g., Lumen Gentium 11; Sacrosanctum Concilium 2, 7, 9; Unitatis Redintegratio 15; Christus Dominus 15, 30/2; Apostolicam Actuositatem 3; Presbyterorum Ordinis 4, 5.

¹⁵E.g., Vinzenz Pfnür, "Beyond and Old Polemic: sola fide/opus operatum," Origins, vol. 8, no. 30 (Jan. 11, 1979) 478-80; see also "Recognition of the Augsburg Confession by the Catholic Church?" in The Role of the Augsburg Confession: Catholic and Lutheran Views, Ed. Joseph E. Burgess, Fortress Press, Philadelphia, 1980, 1-26.

¹⁶An Associated Press news release, published in the Milwaukee Journal, Sunday, January 25, 1981, p. 8, reports a speech of Pope John Paul II to the Sacred Roman Rota, in which he criticizes "easy" marriage annulments; according to unnamed "Vatican sources," the Pope had reference to the situation in the United States in which the diocesan tribunals have granted 43,470 of the world-wide total of 55,450 annulments granted by the Roman Catholic Church in 1978. Of the overall increase in annulments granted in comparison with the 1973 world total of 11,120, American tribunals account for 33,816. This comes to 76%, for something like 10% of the total membership of the Church. American tribunals now account for some 80% of all annulments granted.

¹⁷Karl Rahner, "Priestertum der Frau?" Stimmen der Zeit, vol. 195, no. 5 (May, 1977), 291-301; for his earlier and contrasting view of the prescriptive value of the ecclesial tradition, see "Reflections on the Concept of Jus divinum in Catholic Thought," Theological Investigations 5, 219-45, esp. 227.

¹⁸Donald Keefe, "Sacramental Sexuality and the Ordination of Women," Institute for Theological Encounter with Science and Technology Proceedings, August, 1976, 13-28; reprinted in Communio, vol. 5, no. 3, (Fall, 1978), 228-51.

¹⁹Eric Voegelin, Order in History, vol. 3, Plato and Aristotle, Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, La., 1957, 170-214.

²⁰Edward Kilmartin, "Apostolic Office: Sacrament of Christ," Theological Studies, vol. 36, no. 2 (June, 1975) 243-64.